Implementation of Maximum Sustainable Yield under an Age-Structured Model

Working Paper, 'Implementation of Maximum Sustainable Yield under an Age-Structured Model',(Kanik&Kucuksenel, 2012) (full text)

Abstract:  One of the main goals stated in the proposals for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) reform is achieving maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for all European fisheries by 2015. In this paper, we consider the mechanism design problem for allocation of fishing rights to achieve MSY harvesting conditions. We study an age-structured fish population model and apply this model for a fishing environment including two fishermen having perfect or imperfect fishing selectivity. Fishing technology is embedded in the economic model as one of the key determinants of a fisherman’s catch composition. If we assume that fishermen are non-satiated and they fulfill their remaining quotas through capturing untargeted (less revenue-generating) fish after targeted fish population is fully caught, the fix ratio of the catch of targeted fish to untargeted fish,derived from catchability coefficients, is not valid anymore. As a result, we show that not only the age-structure or fishing technology but also the estimated level of MSY is steering the optimal allocation of quotas. Accordingly, we determine technology-based optimal quota shares for each fisherman at particular MSY levels. We also show that the optimal allocation of fishing quotas does not have a bang-bang nature under imperfect fishing selectivity.  

Keywords: Age-structured model, Allocation of quotas, Fishing technology, Maximum sustainable yield, Mechanism design, Total allowable catch.  

JEL Classifications: D45, D47, Q22, Q56, Q58

*This study was supported in part by a Marie Curie International Reintegration Grant within the 7th 

 European Community Framework Programme.

Useful Math for Microeconomics

Useful notes for Econ students (on mathematical optimization).

Jonathan Levin & Antonio Rangel (September, 2001) (full text)

Mechanism Design for Fisheries Market

This is to present my master's thesis on mechanism design for fisheries market. In particular, mathematical optimization tools, game theoretical and behavioral approaches are used for designing an efficient quota allocation mechanism for fisheries market.

MECHANISM DESIGN FOR THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF QUOTAS AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH FOR EU FISHERIES UNDER AN AGE-STRUCTURED MODEL (full text) (slides)

Abstract: In this study, we consider the mechanism design problem for the optimal allocation of fishing quotas at different total allowable catch (TAC) levels. An age-structured fish population model is employed. Fishing technologies are embedded in the economic model as a key determinant.  As a result, we showed that  the quota allocation mechanism is important to minimize the impact of fishing on total fish biomass or achieve maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Moreover, we indicated technology-based optimality conditions for allocation of quotas at different TAC levels, which minimize the impact of fishing on total fish biomass or enable us to achieve MSY.  Under the consideration that the  fishermen are non-satiated and they fulfill their remaining quotas through capturing untargeted (less revenue-generating) fish after the targeted fish population is fully caught, the fix ratio of the catch of targeted fish to untargeted fish is not valid anymore. Concordantly, we indicated  technology-based optimal quota levels, including the interior solutions rather than bang-bang solutions.